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A COMPARISON OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF AUSTRALIA
AND THE UNITED STATES *
ZELMAN COWAN**

The Commonwealth of Australia celebrated its fiftieth birthday only three years ago. It came into existence in January 1901
under the terms of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution
Act,
was a statute
the United Kingdom Parliament. Its
originwhich
in a British Act of
of Parliament 1 did not mean that the
driving force for the establishment of the federation came from
outside Australia. During the last decade of the nineteenth century, there had been considerable activity in Australia in support
of the federal movement. A national convention met at Sydney
in 1891 and approved a draft constitution. After a lapse of some
years, another convention met in 1897-8, successively in Adelaide,
Sydney and Melbourne. At this assembly, the earlier draft constitution was revised. After submission to popular referenda in
the various States,2 and after minor modifications, this draft was
submitted to the United Kingdom Parliament and emerged as the
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act.
There are six States within the Australian Commonwealth:
Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania, South Australia and Western Australia. These States had been granted
parliamentary and governmental institutions on the British model
during the course of the nineteenth century. During the second
half of that century there had been some moves towards closer
association. These earlier moves were Australasian rather than
Australian, as it was contemplated that New Zealand and Fiji
might participate. A loose association was established by the
Federal Council of Australasia Act, 1885. The organization possessed very limited powers and was much weakened by the
abstention of New South Wales, the principal State. It was a
weaker counterpart of the organization established by the American Articles of Confederation. It lingered on until its existence
was formally terminated on the establishment of the Commonwealth.'
The Constitution of the United States was born in the aftermath of revolution and war. No comparable pressures attended
• Delivered as one of the 1954 James McCormick Mitchell Lectures.
• Visiting Professor, Harvard Law School, 1953-54; Professor of Public Law
and Dean, University of Melbourne, Australia, Law School since 1951.
1. Likewise, the Canadian Constitution has its legal source in a United Kingdom
Act, the British North America Act, originally enacted in 1867.
2. Western Australia approved the Constitution at a later date than the other
states.
3. The Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, section 6, formally repealed
the Federal Council of Australasia Act.
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the founding of the Australian Commonwealth. Various factors
encouraged the federal movement. It was felt that a unified defence policy was desirable. German moves in New Guinea had
caused alarm, and there was some fear of possible hostile action
by other foreign powers. A British military expert had reported
adversely on the state of colonial defences and had recommended
greater inter-colonial cooperation and coordination. Differences
between states on trade policy (as between free trade and protectionist economies) made it desirable to seek resolution on the
basis of a common and nation-wide policy. The federal movement
also reflected the growth of an Australian nationalism.
In devising a federal form of government the Australian
founding fathers preferred the American to the Canadian model
in the sense that specific powers were vested in the central and
national government, while the residue of powers remained with
the States. The Tenth Amendment found its counterpart in
Sections 106 and 107 of the Commonwealth Constitution which
provided that the Constitution of each State should, subject to
the federal Constitution, continue to operate, and that every power
of a State parliament should continue unless it was exclusively
vested by the federal Constitution in the Commonwealth, or was
withdrawn from the State parliament. The Australian founding
fathers were, apart from a handful of unificationists, anxious to
preserve State powers and structures as far as possible. This was
reflected in what was perhaps the principal matter for debate
in the constitutional conventions, the structure and powers of the
Senate which was conceived as a protector of State interests. It
was reflected also in other provisions of the Constitution. Section
51 (iii) authorized the Commonwealth parliament to make laws
with respect to bounties on the production or export of goods, but
so that such bounties should be uniform throughout the Commonwealth, Section 99 provided that the Commonwealth should not
by any law or regulation of trade, commerce or revenue give preference to one State or any part thereof over a.nother State or any
part thereof. Such provisions argued a fear that Commonwealth
machinery might be put to uses which would prejudice State
interests. No heed was given to the consideration, obvious today,
that formal equality as enjoined by such provisions might work
against real or meaningful equality. It is perhaps also worth
recalling that one of the catchcries which invited popular support
for the proposed federal Constitution was the claim that it (the
new National Government) would cost the citizens of the various
states no more than the price of a dog license !
The debates in the conventions of the eighteen nineties show
clearly enough that considerable attention was paid to American
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precedents, and very little if any to the form of the Canadian
Constitution. The Canadian founding fathers were much more
concerned with the importance of establishing a strong national
government than their Australian counterparts.4 However, the
Australian and the Canadian constitutions have some common
elements, in respect of which they differ from the United States
Constitution. Both Canada and Australia established their federatidns within the British Empire, and their British origin naturally
involved institutional differences, for example, in relation to the
Crown. Again, the Canadian Constitution was enacted in 1867 and
the Australian in 1900, when the conduct of the external affairs
of both countries was still firmly in United Kingdom hands. A
comparison of treaty and treaty enforcement powers in the two
British federations on the one hand and in the United States
Constitution on the other reveals quite striking differences, stemming from the colonial origins of the two British federations.
With the rapid change in the international status of Australia and
Canada, this has given rise to problems which will be considered
at a later stage. For the present, we shall be concerned with some
of the more important parallels and divergencies in the American
and Australian Constitutions.
II
We start with a major difference in the two Constitutions.
This was stated by an eminent English lawyer in the course of
the debate on the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution bill
in the British House of Commons:
The difference between the Constitution which this Bill proposes to set up and the Constitution of the -United States is
enormous and fundamenal. This Bill is permeated through and
through with the spirit of the greatest institution which exists
in the Empire. . . . I mean the institution of responsible
government under which the Executive is directly responsible
to-nay almost the creature of-the Legislature. That is not so
in America . . .. Therefore what you have here is nothing
aldn to the Constitution of the United States except in its most
superficial features. 5
This is overdrawn, but it does serve to point up an essential
difference. Responsible government in the British sense, that is,
4. In a judgment of the Privy Council, Attorney-General for the Commonwealth
of Australia v. Colonial Sugar Refining Co., Ltd., [1941] A. C. 237, 252-253, Lord Haldane spoke of the Australian and United States Constitutions as federal in "the strict sense
of the term," because the residue of powers was left with the States. Since this was
not the case in Canada, the conclusion drawn by the judge was that that Constitution
was federal only in a "loose sense." From whence the judge derived this definition of
the federal principle is nowhere explicitly stated!
5. 83 PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES (4th Series) 98, 99 (1900).
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the notion of the executive as a parliamentaryexecutive dependent upon the control of a parliamentary majority, was already well
established in the Australian States in pre-federation days. When
the founding fathers came to fashion the Commonwealth Constitution, it is not surprising that they made similar provision for
the new national government. What is more remarkable is that
in the 1891 draft Constitution (which was prepared by Griffith
who later became Chief Justice of Queensland, and, or federation,
first Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia) it was provided that Ministers of State might, not must, be members of
either House of the legislature. 1891 was a time of instability
and recurrent crisis in State governments, and this suggested to
some that the new national government might possibly depart
from the settled British pattern. But by 1897-8, the local political
situation had become more stable. The 1891 draft was amended,
and finally appeared in Section 64 of the Constitution in the form
of a mandatory requirement that Ministers must be members of
either house of the legislature. It is assumed though it is not
expressly stated that such ministers shall be responsible to the
parliament.
The United States Constitution, to the contrary, expressly
prohibits persons holding office under the United States from
being members of Congress during their tenure of office. In this
sense the doctrine of the separation of powers is firmly established
in the United States.
It has been aptly observed' that the linking of parliamentaryexecutive government (responsible government) to the federal
structure in the Australian Constitution has produced a unique
synthesis of British and American Constitutional ideas and practice. This raises a question as to the extent to which the doctrine
of the separation of powers is otherwise modified by the existence
of responsible government. The doctrine held great appeal for
the American draftsmen, and it appears to be enshrined in those
provisions of the Constitution which separately assign legislative,
executive and judicial power. In this formal respect, 7the
Australian Constitution closely follows the American pattern.
It is interesting to note that there are only two decisions of
the Supreme Court of the United States in which a purported vesting of power by Congress in the executive has been held unconstitutional on grounds of improper delegation. Both arose out of
6. SAwm, THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA 38 (Palon, ed. 1952).
7. Cf. U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 1, Art. II, § 1, Art. III, § 1; COMMONWEALTH CONST.
§§ 1, 61, 71.
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New Deal legislation." In Schechter Poultry Corporationv. U. S.,
Congress had authorized the President to promulgate codes of
fair competition on a finding that a code would tend to effectuate
the policy of the Act. The Supreme Court invalidated the Act
on the ground that "Here . . . is an attempted delegation not
confined to any single act nor to any class or group of acts identified or described by reference to a standard." 9 The unconstitutional element in the legislation lay in its failure to prescribe a
sufficient standard to which the executive might refer in exercising
the powers conferred by Congress. However, subsequent delegations in wide terms have been upheld upon the footing that sufficiently clear standards have been prescribed. In U. S. v. Rock
Royal Cooperative, ° broad delegated powers with respect to
agricultural marketing were sustained on this basis over a sharp
dissent by Roberts J. directed precisely to the absence of a sufficient standard. In Yakus v. U. S.,11 powers were granted to the
OPA to stabilize prices and to prevent speculative, abnormal, and
unwarranted increases in prices and rents. The administrator
was directed to make price regulations which in his judgment
were generally fair and equitable and would effectuate the purposes of the Act. The Supreme Court found that adequate standards were prescribed by Congress and upheld the constitutionality
of the delegation.
It is quite clear that there is a very wide area of permissible
delegation of legislative power to the executive. On a review of
the recent cases, it has been remarked by Professor Jaffe that
it can "undoubtedly . . . be argued that realistically Schechter
has been put in the museum of constitutional history,"" and Professor Corwin in his lectures on Total War and the Constitution
has spoken of the doctrine of separation of powers in this context
as "shattered' ' 8 and as nothing more than "a smoothly transmitted platitude. "4
At the same time, the cases stand as authority for the proposition that, lacking a sufficient prescription of standards, a delegation will violate the Constitution. Jaffe has suggested that this is
not necessarily an academic abstraction; even though the Court
8. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (1935), Schechter Poultry Corp. V.
United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935) ; see Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative
Power, 47 COL. L. R. 359, 361 (1947).
9. 295 U. S. 495, 552 (1935).
10. 307 U. S. 533 (1939).
11. 321 U. S. 414 (1944).
12. JAFFE, suPra note 8. at 581.
13. ComviN, ToTAL WAR AND THE CONSTrruTION 174 (1946).
14. Id. at 40.
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will concede wide latitude, it may still be possible to envisage a
situation in which the doctrine of the Schechter case might be
successfully invoked. 15
As the Australian cases stand, it is clear that a delegation of
legislative power to the executive would not be invalidated on the
ground that it offends against any doctrine of the separation of
powers. In Victorian Stevedoring and General Contracting Co.
and Meakes v. Dignan, 6 such a challenge was unsuccessfully
directed against a provision in the Transport Workers' Act which
authorized the executive to make regulations for the employment
of transport workers. Such regulations were to have effect notwithstanding anything in any other Act. Dixon J. noted the very
similar general distribution of powers in the United States and
Australian constitutions as between legislature, executive and
judiciary. On the assumption that the Act authorised a delegation of legislative power, he nevertheless concluded that this was
not a valid constitutional objection.
The existence in Parliament of power to authorize subordinate
legislation may be ascribed to a conception of that legislative
power which depends less upon juristic analysis and perhaps
more upon the history and usages of British legislation and the
theories of English law.lt
Evatt J. observed that responsible government was part of the
Australian Constitutional structure and that this necessarily involved a close relationship between the executive and legislative
branches of government.
The statesmen and lawyers concerned in the framing of the
Australian Constitution, when they treated of 'legislative power'
in relation to the self-governing colonies, had in view an authority which, over a limited area or subject matter, resembled
that of the British Parliament. Such authority always extended beyond the issue by Parliament of such commands by
any person or authority it chose to select or create. 'Legislative
power' connoted the power to deposit or delegate legislative
power because this was implied in the idea of parliamentary
sovereignty itself.18
A further attack on the validity of very wide delegated powers
was struck down by the High Court in Wishart v. Fraser.9 That
case involved legislation enacted early in the Second World War
which authorised the executive to make regulations for securing
the public safety and the defence of the Commonwealth and for
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

supra note 8, at 581.
46 C. L. R. 73 (1931).
Id. at 101-121.
Id. at 117-118.
64 C. L. R. 470 (1941).
JAFFE,
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prescribing all matters which are necessary or convenient to be
proscribed for the more effectual prosecution of the war. It was
unsuccessfully argued that the effect of this legislation was to
turn over the whole defence power of the Commonwealth to the
executive. That was the practical effect of the legislation, and
this power was used extensively throughout the war to provide
the substantial legislative framework within which the Commonwealth prosecuted the war.
It is to be noted that arguments basedupon the unconstitutionality of such delegation were rejected in limine on the footing that
within a framework of responsible government and of British
constitutional and institutional history, this particular aspect of
the doctrine of the separation of powers had no place. The Court
in Dignan's Case, however, observed that excessively wide delegation might invite a declaration of unconstitutionality upon a different ground: that the scope of a delegation of power might be so
wide and uncertain that the law in question could not properly be
subsumed under any specific head of power vested in the Commonwealth Parliament. In view of the wide delegations upheld
by the Court, it would seem that the case in which such a principle
could be successfully invoked would-be very unusual.
The doctrine of the separation of powers as between executive
and legislature has given rise to other problems within the United
States. Corwin has shown how a vague and ill-defined practice
of presidential action independent of congressional authorization
emerged, particularly in the period immediately preceding Pearl
Harbour and in the years which followed. 0 The constitutional
theory which justified such action was obscure and not clearly articulated. It has been suggested that it may have drawn support
from the commander-in-chief clause2 ' and from the presidential
responsibility for the faithful execution of the law.22
The Supreme Court elected 2s to consider this question in
Youngstown Steel and Tube Co. v. Sawyer.2 4 Following the breakdown of negotiations in a steel industry dispute, President Truman without express statutory authority, directed seizure of the
steel mills by the Secretary of Commerce. The presidential order
recited the great importance of continued steel production to the
defehce program of the country and to the discharge of United
States international obligations. Seizure under this order was
20. CoRWIN, op. cit. supra note 13, at 16 et seq., 144 et seq.

21. Art. II §2.
22. Art. II § 4.
23. Freund, The Supreme Court, 1951 Term, 66 HARV. L. REv. 89-95 (1952).
24. 343 U. S. 579 (1952).

See Kaufer, The Steel Seizure Case: Congress, the

President and the Supreme Court, 59 MicH. L. REv. 141 (1952).
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contested by the steel companies, and the Supreme Court by a
majority held it unconstitutional. There was considerable diversity of opinion among the majority judges but Black J. speaking for the Court, and Douglas J., were quite explicit on the point
that a violation of the doctrine of the separation of powers was
involved. Presidential action in this case involved an intrusion
into the legislative field, for Congress alone, in these circumstances, could authorize seizure.
The question whether such executive action would be constitutional in Australia is, in a sense, a barren one. The framework of
responsible government would make it very unlikely that executive
action would be taken without security of legislative support or
authorization. Perhaps it should be recorded here that in the
events leading up to the Steel Case, the President invited Congress to take contrary action if it so desired, but received no response. As a matter of law, it appears to be the law that if the
executive elected to take such action in Australia without legislative authorization, it would be unconstitutional. This raises some
difficult questions about the scope of the exercise of executive
power under the royal prerogative. There is some support in
judicial dicta for the proposition that the prerogative would
permit the Commonwealth executive in the course of military
operations in time of war to seize property even without compensation.25 The broadest proposition which emerges from the cases
is that in time of war, the existence of national danger vests authority in the executive to do things which would not otherwise
be justifiable. The validity of such executive action depends in
general upon a demonstration that the action was necessary for
the national security, and that the executive acted on that basis.2
This would not provide constitutional support for the executive seizure in the Steel Case under Australian law. The apprehended emergency would not have attracted power. The limits
on the exercise of independent executive power raise questions
bearing upon the extent of the prerogative of the Crown. These
limits have not been worked out by reference to any general or
theoretical considerations involving the doctrine of separation of
powers; they were hammered out rather in the great seventeenth
century struggles between Crown and Parliament.
In certain respects, executive powers are, as a matter of law,
wider in Australia than in the United States. Under Art. 1, Sec. 8,
25. Johnson, Fear & Kingham v. The Commonwealth, 67 C. L. R. 314 (1943), per
Latham C. 3. and Starke 3.
26. Commonwealth v. Colonial Combing, Spinning and Weaving Co., Ltd., 31
C. L. R. 421, 442 (1922), per Isaacs J. See WYNEs, LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWERS
IN AUSTRALIA 186 et seq. (1936).
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power to declare war is vested in Congress, while under the prerogative such power is vested in the Crown. Likewise under the
prerogative, the treaty making power is vested in the executive,
wvhile the comparable presidential power under Art. 2, See. 2 is
limited by the requirement of senatorial consent. It need only be
observed that such exercises of executive power in Australia are
conditioned by the fact that they are exercised and exercisable by
a responsible executive.
In respect of judicial power, however, rather different considerations arise. See. 71 of the Commonwealth Constitution, like
Art. 3, Sec. 1 of the United States Constitution vests judicial
power in courts. In Dignan's Case2 7, the High Court in rejecting
arguments based upon the alleged separation of legislative and
executive powers, pointed to the fact that different considerations
arose in respect of judicial power. It was observed that British
constitutional history and doctrine lays heavy stress upon the
importance of judicial independence.
For Australia, a constitutional obligation to separate judicial
power has arisen out of the judicial interpretation of Sees. 71 and
72 of the Constitution. Sec. 71 vests judicial power in courts,
while See. 72 provides that judges of these courts shall not be removed except by the Governor-General in Council on an address
from both Houses of the Parliament in the same session, praying
for such removal on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity. It was held by a majority in the High Court of Australia in Waterside Workers Federation of Australia v. J. W.
Alexander, Ltd.,2" that See. 72 required that judges exercising
federal judicial power under Sec. 71 should be appointed for life.
There was a forceful dissent and the decision was subsequently
challenged on this, point, but it must now be taken to be settled
law.29 It has been held to follow from this that it is unconstitutional to invest a person or body, not possessing life tenure, with
judicial power. This has squarely raised the very difficult problem
of defining the characteristic or essence of judicial power. It is
not surprising that there have been sharp differences in the courts
on this point. I have discussed this problem elsewhere, and I do
not propose to renew that discussion here.3 0 There are, however,
27. 46 C. L. R. 73 (1931).
28. 25 C. L. R. 434 (1918).
29. Challenged in argument in Shell Co. of Australia, Ltd. v. Federal Commissioner
of Taxation [1931] A. C. 275, 280, but rnot decided. See Silk Bros. Pty., Ltd. v. State
Electricity Commission, 67 C. L. R. 1 (1943), Peacock v. Newtown Building Society,
67 C. L. R. 25 (1943). See also Cowen, The Separation of Judicial Power and the
Exercise of Defence Powers in Australia, 26 CANADIAN B. Ray. 829, 831-832 .(1948).
30. 26 CANADIAN B. REv. 829 (1948).
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some anomalous decisions. In R. v. Bevan, 1 and R. v. Cox, 2 an
attack was made upon the validity of courts martial on the ground
that their members were not appointed for life and that they were
therefore unconstitutionally exercising judicial power. On the
definitions of judicial power propounded at various times in the
High Court this should have caused difficulty. However, the High
Court flatly rejected the argument. The difficulty is to find a justification in principle. One of the judges drew on American authority for the proposition that courts martial do not exercise
judicial power. Such cases are dubious authority in Australia.
Decisions like Dynes v. Hoover,3 3 lay some stress on the provision
in the Fifth Amendment that no person shall be held to answer
for capital or other infamous crime mless on a presentment or
indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or
naval forces. In Kurtz v. Mofjitt, 4 it was said that the Fifth
Amendment left cases arising in the land or naval forces "subject
to the rules for the government and regulation of these forces
which, by the eighth section of the first article of the Constitution,
Congress is empowered to make." There is no comparable provision anywhere in the Australian Constitution bearing upon the
special position of the armed forces. In the Australian court
martial cases, the only satisfactory explanation appears to be that
the logic of an earlier position has been made to bend to the demands of an important practical problem.
To sum up thus far: the Australian Constitution departs fundamentally from the American model in requiring Ministers of
State to be members of the legislature. The Australian courts
have expressly rejected the doctrine that there is any constitutional prohibition against vesting legislative powers in the executive. On the other hand, there is American authority which holds
that such an investiture may violate the doctrine of the separation
of powers. From a practical standpoint the two Constitutions
may not be too far apart; the American courts have upheld very
wide delegations of power upon the footing that the legislature
has prescribed sufficient standards under which the executive may
exercise the power. The Australian courts have, however, suggested that an uncontrolled delegation may be unconstitutional on
the ground that its breadth and uncertainty might deprive it of
the character of a law properly subsumable under any specific
head of Commonwealth power.
31. 66 C. L. R. 452 (1942).
32. 71 C. L P_ 1 (1945).
33. 61 U. S.65 (1857).
34. 115 U. S. 487. 500 (1885).
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There is a body of Australian authority which effectively
separates judicial power. This results from a definition of the
word "courts" in the judicature chapter of the Constitution, in
requiring members of courts (who alone exercise judicial power)
to have life tenure. The obligation to isolate judicial power has
called forth some very pretty judicial differences and quarrels,
not to mention evasion, as in the court martial cases, when unsatisfactory practical consequences would follow a logical application
of previously agreed principle.
A word may be said on the linking of responsible government
to a federal structure. It does not appear that this unusual mating has produced a "sport of nature". Cabinet government in
Australia has developed pretty much along British lines even
though the structure of power distribution is federal. An Australian commentator on the American political scene would not
require uncanny gifts of observation to suggest that the path of
political life might be smoother if the United States were to mate
responsible government to federalism. * It may -perhaps be appropriate to note that at least one distinguished American authority has cast a fond and somewhat lingering glance at the
cabinet system and expressed the wish that at least a pale imitation of it might be introduced into the United States.,5
l.
One of the most interesting differences in the political structure and institutions of Australia and the United States is to be
found in the position and importance of the Senate in the two
countries. Reference has already been made to the fact that the
place of the Senate in the Australian federation was the great
topic of debate in the national conventions of the eighteen nineties.
It was to the Senate primarily that the founding fathers looked
for the protection of State interests.
Here the United States provided a model. It was settled that
each State should be equally represented in the Senate. In the
draft Constitution of 1891, it was provided that the Senate should
be indirectly elected. This followed the United States Constitution which was amended in this respect by the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913. The Convention of 1897-8, however, reversed the
decision of 1891 and provided for direct popular election. To ensure that the Senate should be an effective protector of State interests, its powers were made coordinate with those of the Lower
House, save in the matter of flnancial legislation where its power
35.

CoRwiN, OUR CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION AND How To ROUND IT OUT,

17-21 (Publications of Brandeis Lawyers' Society 1951).
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in law was still strong. 6 Agreement upon a provision to deal with
deadlocks between the two Houses was difficult, but was finally
concluded in the terms of Sec. 57 of the Constitution.8 7 Senators
were to hold office for six years; members of the House of Representatives for a maximum of three. It was envisaged that the
membership of the Senate should as nearly as possible be one half
that of the Lower House.8 8 For many years there were 36 Senators (six from each State) and 75 members of the Lower House.
A few years ago, the membership was increased to 60 Senators
(ten from each State) and 123 Representatives. 9
In view of the substantial similarity in structure and powers,
it might have been thought that the Senates in the two countries
would enjoy substantially similar positions. But while as between
the two Houses of Congress, the Senate is demonstrably the more
important, precisely the opposite is true in Australia. The comment of Sir John Latham, a former Chief Justice of the High
Court of Australia, and previously a member of the Commonwealth legislature and executive may be quoted in this context:
The Senate was to be the States' House. This anticipation
has been almost completely falsified by results. The Senate is
as much a party house as the lower house. The candidates for
the Senate are presented to the voters in teams selected by the
political parties. The personality of the candidates is of minor
importance.
The idea of the Senate as a second chamber of wise and experienced men, sitting in sober and deliberate-and largely nonparty-review of possibly hasty legislation passed by the lower
house has not been realized in practice. 40
It would not be very profitable to compare the two Senates in
terms of their protection of State interests. It is a matter of
history that from the early days of federation the Australian Senate divided as a party house. On the other hand, it would surely
be a misconstruction of the position and importance of the United
States Senate to account it primarily a States' house. Since indirect election was replaced by direct election under the Seventeenth Amendment, it is probably even less so. But it does occupy
a position of great importance in the nationalpolicy.
What explains the difference? Here I may recount an odd
story. An Australian observer suggests, among others, two rea36. See §§ 53, 54 and 55 of the Constitution.
37. See Beasley in EssAYs ON THE AUSTRALiAN

Mitchell, ed. 1952).
38. § 24.
39.

REPDESENTATION

Acr (1948).

CONSTITUTION

67-72

40. Lathamn, The Changing Constitution, 1 SYDNEz L. REv. 14, 22 (1953).
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sons for the decline of the Australian Senate. One is the fact
that the Senators are elected from the State at large, and therefore are not personally as well known as the Representatives who
come from smaller districts. The second is that their term is
six years against the lower house's three; so that they are more
remote from the prevailing popular will.' I asked a distinguished
American constitutional lawyer how he explained the predominance of the Senate in the United States Congress. He gave
among other reasons the following:
(1) Senators possess
special authority through being elected from the State at large;
they are more widely known than representatives who are elected
from districts; (2) they derive greater power and influence from
their longer term of office which is six against the representatives'
two years !
It is not very easy to pinpoint reasons for such divergent developments in the two countries. It may be that the proportions
in the two Houses have something to do with it. In the United
States, the Senate is only about one-fifth the size of the House of
Representatives while in Australia the proportion is roughly one
to two. It is possible that the disparity in terms of office in the
United States is too great; a two year term in the House of Representatives is very short indeed, while the three year term of
the Australian House of Representatives may give it greater stability and importance. There are only two Senators elected from
each State in the United States; and this may mean that the individual Senators are much better known than ten (formerly six)
from each Australian State. Probably the difference in party
structure has much to do with this problem. In the United States,
this is relatively loose and fluid, while in Australia a tighter classparty system has been long established. When to this is added
the factor of responsible government in Australia, in which the
British tradition has for long emphasized the predominance of the
lower House, it is perhaps not surprising that the Australian Senate's importance has tended to decline.
It is certainly the case that the Senate in Australia has failed
to meet the expectations of the founding fathers as a States'
House. It has been said that:
A .class basis of Australian party warfare was already emerging [at federation] and so long as that basis remained dominant
.there could be no prospect of a working 'States' House' at all.
When parties came to be based broadly upon classes the interests
of either class in one State were more likely to be more nearly
41. Crisp, THE
LrA174

etseq.
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linked to those of the same class in other States than with the
opposite class in the same State.But more interesting still, having regard both to the comparable
structure of the United States Senate and to the seemingly large
constitutional powers vested in the Australian Senate is the latter's remarkable inferiority as a House of the legislature. Its
debates are generally poor, its membership relatively insignificant
in stature, and it is generally regarded in Australia as a disappointment. Various reasons have been and may be suggested for
its inferior status, but one can only conclude with a recent commentary on Australian institutions that its failure to measure up
is "truly remarkable.'"

IV
Both the American and Australian courts have frequently
been concerned with the problem of implications to be drawn from
the federal character of the Constitution. This has most often
arisen in the context of intergovernmental immunities. In various
forms, this problem was under consideration by the Supreme
Court of the United States during the greater part of the nineteenth century. There is no evidence from the debates in the constitutional conventions of the 'nineties that the Australian founding fathers had any general awareness of this problem or any
disposition to deal with it. 44 Certain specific provisions which
bear on this matter were written into the Constitution: thus the
Commonwealth Parliament's power to legislate with respect to
banking expressly excluded State banking,45 and the similar power
with respect to insurance excluded State insurance.4 6 If a State
engaged either in banking or insurance activities, its operations
would not be subject to Commonwealth legislative control. So
too, Sec. 114 of the Constitution provided, in part, that "A State
shall not . . . impose any tax on property of any kind belonging
to the Commonwealth nor shall the Commonwealth impose any
tax on property of any kind belonging to a State."
It' might have been thought that the existence of specific
provisions of this kind excluded the drawing of any general implications with respect to intergovernmental immunities. 4 7 However when the problem arose very early in the history of the
Commonwealth-indeed in the first volume of the Commonwealth
Law Reports-in terms of State power to impose a stamp tax
42. Id. at 176.
43. Id. at 183.
44. Sawer, Implicatiorw and the Contitution, 4 Rls JuDICATA 88-90 (1949).
4
8.(
..
45. § 51 (XIII). " .
46.§ 51 (XIV).
47. See Sawer, supra note 44 at 89.
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on a Commonwealth officer's receipt for his salary, the High
Court unanimously held this to be unconstitutional on the footing
of a general doctrine of immunity of instrumentalities. In so
deciding, the Court relied heavily on American authority, and
justified this in sweeping terms:
We think that, sitting here, we are entitled to assume-what,
after all, is a fact of public notoriety-that some, if not all of
the framers of [the] Constitution were familiar . . . with
the Constitution of the United States. . . . When, therefore,
under these circumstances, we find embodied in the Constitution
provisions undistinguishable in substance, though varied in
form, from provisions of the Constitution of the United States
which had long since been judicially interpreted by the Supreme
Court of that Republic, it is not an unreasonable inference that
its framers intended that like provisions should receive like
interpretation.4"
In this case the Australian High Court followed the United States'
Supreme Court decision in McCulloch v. Maryland.49 When the
issue of liability of federal salaries to State taxation was posed in
Deakin v. Webb,50 the High Court followed and relied on Dobbins
v. Commissioners of Erie County.51 When the converse problem
of the subjection of State instrumentalities (State railways) to
Commonwealth arbitration awards arose, the High Court in
holding that they were not subject 52 squarely rested on Collector
v. Day,53 where the Supreme Court had denied the constitutionality of a federal tax on State salaries.
From 1906, there was a persistent dissent in the High Court
of Australia on this point. When, by 1920, the dissent had become the majority view, the High Court held, in the most celebrated of all Australian constitutional cases, the Engineers'
Case,5 4 that a Commonwealth Arbitration Court award bound a
State instrumentality. Some of the earlier decisions were of
necessity overruled, while others were reinterpreted in the sense
that their basis was shifted from the doctrine of the immunity of
instrumentalities. The new doctrine called, too, for a revised view
of the weight of American authority in Australian constitutional
interpretation.
We conceive that American authorities, however illustrious
the tribunals may be, are not a secure basis on which to build
fundamentally with respect to our own Constitution. While in
48.
49.
50.
51.

D'Emden v. Pedder. 1 C. L. R. 91, 113 (1904).
4-Wheat. 316 CU. S. 1819)
1 C. L. R. 585 (1904).
16 Pet. 435 (U. S. 1842).

52. Railway Servants' Case, 4 C. L. PL 488 (1906).

53. 11 Wall. 113 CU. S. 1870).
54. Amalgamated Sodety of Engineersv. Adelaide Steamship Co., Ltd., 28 C. L. F.
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secondary and subsidiary matters they may, and sometimes do,
afford considerable light and assistance, they cannot . .

. be

recognized as standards whereby to measure the respective rights
of the Commonwealth and States under the Australian Constitution. For the proper construction of the Australian Constitution it is essential to bear in mind two cardinal features of our
political system which are interwoven in its texture and, notwithstanding considerable similarity of structural design, including the depository of the residual powers, radically distinguish
it from the American Constitution. Pervading the instrument,
they must be taken into account in determining the meaning of
its language. One is the common sovereignty of all parts of the
the other is the principle of responsible governBritish
55 Empire;
ment.
During the period in which the doctrine of the ETigineers'
Case was in the ascendant, reliance on American authority greatly
lessened. However, since 1945 there has been some revival in
Australia of doctrines of intergovernmental immunity. The problem was posed in Melbourne Corporation. v. Commonwealt,16
where the issue was the validity of legislation providing that,
except with the consent of a Commonwealth officer, a bank should
not conduct any banking business for a State or for any authority
of a State, including a local government body. The High Court
held the legislation unconstitutional. Although there were some
differences of opinion in the Court, there was a great emphasis
on the point that the vice in the legislation lay in the fact that it
placed special burdens on the States in the exercise of their
governmental functions. The "revived" doctrines of intergovernmental immunity have found expression in other cases,

notably through Dixon J. (now Chief Justice of the High Court)."7
Chief Justice Dixon served as Australian Ambassador to Washing-

ton during part of the Second World War, and he, of all members
of the Court, is most familiar with the course of American author'ity. The revival of intergovernmental immunities in Australia
has, not surprisingly, brought with it a revived interest in and
regard for American authorities, which have been discussed at
-length in the opinions.
There has also been some awareness of the shift of Australian
doctrine on this point on the part of the American Supreme Court.
In Graves v. New York,58 the Supreme Court overruled Collector
-v. Day in holding -that federal salaries -were subject to State -in55. At 146.

See Latham, Interpretation of the Constitution, EssAYs

AusTRALIAN CoNsrrrurIoN, 30-31 (Else-Mitchell, ed.

:1952).

6H¢ THE

.
56. 74 C. L. R.31 (1947).
57. See Essendon Corp. v. Criterion Theatres, Ltd., 14 C. L. R. I (1947), Uther
"
v. Federal Commissioner of Tazation;74 C. L. R. 508- (1947).
58. 306 U. S. 466 (1939).
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come tax. Frankfurter J. drew attention to Canadian and Australian constitutional developments:
In view of the powerful pull of our decisions upon the courts
charged with maintaining the constitutional equilibrium of the
two other great English federalisms, the Canadian and the Australian courts were at first inclined to follow the earlier doctrines of this Court regarding intergovernmental immunity
*
[citing D'Enden v. Pedder]. Both the Supreme Court
of Canada and the High Court of Australia on fuller consideration-and for present purposes the British North America Act
.
and the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act
. . . raised the same legal issues as does our Constitution-

have completely
rejected the doctrine of intergovernmental im59
munity.

The statement that the doctrine had been "completely"
rejected in Australia probably overshot the mark, even as of 1939.
There were suggestions in a High Court decision in 1937, West v.
Commissioner of Taxation,0 that there might still be life in the
doctrine. And the recent cases in the High Court, notably Melbourne Corporationv. Commonwealth, have certainly revived it.
The present scope and ambit of the doctrine of intergovernmental
immunities in either federation is not very clear. The most recent
decision of importance in the Supreme Court of the United States
is New York v. United States,61 in which a federal excise tax on
the sales of bottled mineral waters sold by New York and drawn
from land owned by it was sustained by a majority. It is not easy
to draw a precise ratio decidendi from this case, 2 and the dissenting views of Black and Douglas JJ. would have opened up a
wide area of operation for intergovernmental immunity. Distinguished commentators have drawn attention to the difficulty
of precisely charting the American doctrine. Justice Roberts,
writing after he had retired from the Supreme Court Bench has
observed that,
In no field of federal jurisprudence has there been greater variation of uncertainty. About one quarter of these decisions
have been expressly or tacitly overruled, modified or ignored
in later cases. Doubtless the explanation is that the Court has
been called upon to exercise statesmanship in an uncharted
region rather than interpretation of the text of the instrument:
to implement policy rather than law.68
59.
60.
Study of
61.

Id. at 490-491.
56 C. L. R. 657. See Pond, Intergovernmental Immunities: A Comparative
the FederalSystem, 26 IowA L. REv. 272 (1941).
326 U.S. 572 (1946).

62. ROBERTS, THE COURT AND

THE CoNsTrruTioN

(1951)

at p. 28 observes that

it was held that the tax was constitutional. "That, however, is about all that can be
said of the case."
63. Id. at 8.
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A former Chief Justice of the Australian High Court has likewise
spoken of the "chequered career" 64 of the American doctrine. It
appears clear that the course of American authority in latter
years has tended to restrict its scope, and insofar as this has involved an abandonment of earlier extravagant positions, it is to be
welcomed. 5
The present situation in Australia is a little obscure.6 6 Reference has already been made to Melbourne Corporationv. Commonwealth in which the High Court declared invalid legislation
which would have obliged the States and their instrumentalities to
bank with the Commonwealth Bank. In this and other cases, there
have been statements in support of a doctrine of intergovernmental immunities as a matter of logical implication from the
existence of a federal structure of government. The present
Chief Justice, Sir Owen Dixon, has expounded the doctrine in
several cases. We have already noted that such members of the
Court as favour the doctrine have not all stated their position in
the same way. It is not clear whether it is the element of discrimination which is decisive, or whether what invalidates legislation on this ground is the existence of a burden uuon the governmental functions of one party to the federal compact, even though
that burden does not arise out of discriminatory legislation.
It is interesting to note two other decisions of the High Court.
In South Australia v. Commonuwealth (the Uniform Tax Case),67
a legislative scheme was devised to drive the States out of the income taxing field. The Commonwealth imposed a high rate of
income tax, for payment of which it legislatively granted priority
to itself. It undertook to make grants to the States on terms of
their withdrawal from this field of taxation, and it purported to
take over State income tax departments.
This legslation was held valid by a majority in the High
Court. It will be apparent that the scheme effectively placed the
States at the financial mercy of the Commonwealth, and if ever
C. J.

64. Melbourne Corp. v. Commonwealth, 74 C. L. R. 31, 56 (1947) per Latham

65. ROBERTS, op. cit. supra note 62 at 35 writes: "The steady progress toward
the abolition of the reciprocal immunities has been beneficial. . . . Save for obvious
discrimination, why is not the citizen of dual sovereizns entitled to refuse confidence that
neither of those sovereigns can nor will by nondiscriminatory taxation of its own citizens
destroy or hamper the operations of the other?"
66. For discussions, see Pond, Interqoverumental Immunities: A Comparative
Study of the Federal System, 26 IOwA L. REv. 72 (1941), Sawer, Implications and the
Constitution,4 REs JUDICATA 15, 85 (1948-9). ESSAYS ON THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION
(1952) : Latham at 29-36, Anderson at 101-108, Hannen at 273-277. Dr. T. C. Brennan's
Interpreting the Constitution (1935) is an attack on the majority position in the
Engineers' case. See also Holmes, Back to Dual Sovereignty, 21 AUSTRALIAN L. J. 162
(1947).
67. 65 C. L. R. 373 (1942),
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there was a case in which intergovernmental immunity was
posed as a practical problem of government, this was it. Starke
J., dissenting, made this point. The Chief Justice, Sir John
Latham, was well aware of the implications of upholding the legislation, but nonetheless held it valid:
Thus if the Commonwealth Parliament were prepared to pass
such legislation (excluding the States from all tax fields and
making grants conditional on Commonwealth satisfaction with
State policies) all State powers would be controlled by the Commonwealth-a result which would mean the end of the political
independence of the States. Such a result cannot be prevented
by any legal decision. The determination of the propriety of any
such policy must rest with the Commonwealth Parliament and
ultimately with the people. The remedy for alleged abuse of
power or for the use of power to promote what are thought to be
improper objects
is to be found in the political arena and not in
68
the Courts.
It is to be noted that the legislation as upheld even required
the States to turn their income tax departments over to the Commonwealth. 69 How the Uniform Tax Case sits with the Melbourne
Corporation Case is not very clear when one looks into the heart
of the two decisions. 70 It is perhaps worth recording that Sir Owen*
Dixon was not a member of the Court which decided the Uniform
71.
Tax Case. In Bank of New South Wales v. Comnmo.wealt,,
it was argued that the Banking Act of' 1947 which purported to
give the Commonwealth Bank a monopoly of all banking (except
banking conducted by State banks) was unconstitutional on the
ground that it denied the States the facilities of all other banks.72
The Court (of which Dixon C. J. was a member) distinguished the
Melbourne Corporation Case on the ground that in the Bank case
the States and their instrumentalities were not specifically -singled
out. As a practical matter it is to be noted that the States were
subject to the same limitations in either case and under either Act.
To sum up: in enunciating a-doctrine of intergovernmental
immunity the first Australian High Court drew heavily upon the
doctrine of the American Supreme Court at a time when the
American doctrine was stated in extreme terms. From 1920 a
strong reaction set in in Australia with the Engineers' Case, and
in this case the High Court drew strength for its new position
from the proposition that there were fundamental differences between the United States and Australian constitutional structures
68. Id. at 429.
69. Anderson, The States and Commonwealth Relations, EssAYs ON THE AusTRALIAN CONSTITUTION 107 (Else-Mitchell, ed. 1952).
70. Id. at 105-107.
71. 76 C. L. R. 1 (1948).
72. The legislation was held unconstitutional on other grounds.
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which denied compelling authority to American decisions on
intergovernmental immunity. Since the end of the Second World

War, there has been a movement back to doctrines of intergovernmental immunities based on a logical deduction from the federal
structure of Australian government. This has given the American
decisions fresh significance in Australia. The contemporary Australian doctrine is not easily defined either in character or scope,
and it may be that it will not be held to operate beyond the area
of direct discriminations against States or their agencies.
For the United States it may be said that the tide has for
some long time past run against the extreme positions taken in
McCulloch v. Maryland, Collector v. Day and similar cases. The
decision in New York v. United States while continuing to move
towards restriction of the scope of the doctrine -still leaves its
limits uncertain.
V

An interesting comparison between the American and Australian Constitutions is revealed by their differing approaches to
the problem of protection of individual rights. From the earliest
days, the American Constitution has included a Bill of Rights
which has been added to from time to time by amendment. Having
regard to the atmosphere in which the United States Constitution
was drafted and adopted, and also to subsequent crises in its history, it is not surprising that it was regarded as appropriate to
place constitutional restraints on government in the interest of
fundamental individual rights. The British conception is different; to a fundamental constitutional doctrine that Parliament is
omnicompetent it is impossible to link the constitutional protection
of individual rights. It is quite another question whether individual rights are in practice more effectively guaranteed in the
United States than in England.
Australian institutions had, in general, developed on the
British model, although of course, there is no place for parliamentary omnicompetence within the Australian federal structure.
However, Australian federation was forged in a very different
Atmosphere to that of 1787. It may perhaps also be said that the
-American founding fathers were much more consciously influenced
by and were more keenly aware of individualist and libertarian
philosophical influences than were their Australian counterparts
of the eighteen nineties.
In fact there are relatively few provisions in the Australian
Constitution which restrain government in the interests of individual rights. The principal exceptions are to be found in
Sees. 116 and 117 of the Constitution. See. 116 provides that
174
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the Commonwealth shall not make any law for establishing any
religion, or for establishing any religious observances, or for
prohibiting the free exercise of any religion, and that no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office
or public trust under the Commonwealth. It will be noted that
this clause broadly parallels the material provisions of Art.
VI, Sec. 3 and the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. It is perhaps of interest to note that in the 1891 draft
of the Constitution these prohibitions were directed to the States.
In 1.897-8 the prohibitions were also addressed to the Commonwealth and as finally adopted the clause only restrained the Commonwealth. This leavse the States unfettered, except insofar as
there may be any special provision in a State constitution.
The section has come up for judicial consideration. In
Krygger v. Williams, 3 it was held that it did not prevent Parliament from applying compulsory military service to conscientious
objectors. It was discussed at some length in Adelaide Company
7 4 where the High Court
of Jehovah's Witnesses v. Commonwealth,
considered regulations enacted under the defence power during the
Second World War which prohibited the advocacy of Jehovah's
Witnesses doctrines as prejudicial to the prosecution of the war.
The Court discussed the American authorities 75 which were cited
to support the proposition that the constitutional protection of
religious freedom could not be phrased in absolute terms. "This
view makes it possible to accord a real measure of practical protection. to religion without involving the community in anarchy.'17
It has been suggested that the decision in the Jehovah's Witnesses
Case probably goes further in permitting restraints than current
American doctrine would allow.77
Sec. 117 of the Australian Constitution provides that "a subject of the Queen resident in any State shall not be subject in any
other State to any disability or discrimination which would not be
equally applicable to him if he were a subject of the Queen resident in such other State." It is to be noted that the phraseology
is odd: the criterion of discrimination is residence, so that it
may be that a discrimination on the basis of domicile is not prohibited. 7 This provision suggests in part the privileges and im73. 15 C. L. R. 366 (1912).
74. 67 C. L. R. 116 (1943).
75. Id. at 127-131, per Latham C. J.
76. Id. at 131.
77. Bailey, Fifty Years of the Australian Constitution, 25 AUSTRALIAN L. J. 314,
327 (1951).
78. Latham, Changing the Constitution, 1 SYDNEY L. Rav. 17 (1953).
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munities clause of Art. IV, Sec. 2 of the United States Constitution
and in part the provisions of the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 7 The legislative history of See. 117 is interesting.
In the 1891 draft, the terminology was much closer to the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment although without reference to
due process. In 1897-8, O'Connor, who was a principal draftsman of the Constitution and subsequently became an original member of the High Court, moved unsuccessfully to add the words of
due process. That close at least did Australia come to the benisons
of a due process clause! As enacted, See. 117 has played an insignificant role in Australian constitutional interpretation.
Two other provisions remain to be considered. There is an
important limitation on the Commonwealth's power to acquire
property. This appears in See. 51 (xxxi) which authorizes the
Commonwealth Parliament to acquire property on just terms from
any State or person for any purpose in respect of which the Parliament has power to make laws. The restraint on power is, of
course, the requirement of provision of just terms and this finds its
American parallel in the Fifth Amendment prohibition against
the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. The American Constitution presined the existence of
a power of eminent domain, and directed attention to restraints
upon its exercise. The Australian founding fathers, doubting the
safety of relying on an imnlied power of eminent domain in a
colonial commonwealth, included a provision expressly conferring
a power of acquisition on the Commonwealth legislature which at
the same time limited and controlled its exercise.
It is very clear, with the hindsight of half a century, that without any such express -power many of the heads of Commonwealth
power would have authorized the acquisition of property for specific purposes. Most of the cases on -property acquisition arose
during the Second World War, and it is now quite clear that if
Sec. 51 (xxxi) had not been written into the Constitution, the defence power, Sec. 51 (vi) would have authorized acquisitions for
defence purposes without challenge to the terms of acquisition.
It was unsucces fullv argued that acquisitions could be effected
under Sec. 51 (vi) without necessary recourse to See. 51 (xxxi).
The High Court, having regard to the clear intendment of the Constitution that provision of just terms be imported into all Commonwealth acquisitions, rejected these arguments. This means that
79. "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
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Sec. 51 (xxxi) is the sole source of Commonwealth legislative
power to acquire property. 0 Moreover the Court has given the
word "property" a wide meaning, so that the temporary taking
of land for Commonwealth use falls within Sec. 51 (xxxi) and
attracts the protection of the Section.8 '
It would seem then, that while framed in terms of power, the
Australian provision operates effectively as a restriction on power
and therefore broadly parallels the material provision of the Fifth
Amendment. However, some distinctions and differences were
pointed to by Dixon J. in Grace Brothers Pty., Ltd. v. Commonwealth.8 2 Since the power of eminent domain operates without
express constitutional authorization, and since the only express
provision in the American Constitution is the limitation upon
power contained in the relevant words of the Fifth Amendment, it
may follow that an acquisition offending the Fifth Amendment
still remains an acquisition whose terms of compensation remain
to be "settled under or moulded by" the Fifth Amendment. In
the Australian Constitution, on the other band, the power and the
-terms of acquisition are rolled up in one provision. The possible
consequence of conferring a power of acquisition-on-just-terms is
that an acquisition denying just terms is not a lawful taking.
Again the limits of just compensation and just terms may be different, and just terms may give greater latitude to governmental
interest. 3 The appropriate conclusion may therefore be that
while American decisions on the Fifth Amendment are useful in
resolving problems arising under Sec. 51 (xxxi), they cannot be
compelling.
Of all the limitations on governmental power written into the
Australian Constitution by far the most important is that in See.
92. The important words in this clause are: "trade, commerce,
and intercourse among the States. whether by means of internal
carriage or ocean navigation, shall be absolutely free." The interpretation of these words has caused enormous difficulty and they
have been before the courts on very many occasions. From the
standpoint of constitutional history. they present relatively little
80. P. 1. Magennis Pty., Ltd. V. Commonwealth, 80 C. L. R. 382 (1949). See
Baker, The Compulsory Acquisition Powers of the Commonwealth, EssAYs oN THE
AUSTRALIAN CONSTrruION 160-161 (Else-Mitchell, ed. 1952).
81. Minister for the Army v. Dalziel, 68 C. L. R. 261 (1944). Baker, supra
note 80 at 163-165.
82. 72 C. L R. 269, 285 et seq. (1946).
83. "In deciding whether any given law is within the power the Court must, of
course, examine the justice of the terms provided. But it is a legislative function to
provide the terms and the Constitution does not mean to deprive the legislature of all
discretion in determining what is just. Nor does justice to the subject and to the State
demand a disregard of the interests of the public or of the Commonwealth." Per Dixon J.
in Grace Bros. Pty., Ltd. v. Commonwealth, 72 C. L. R. 269, 291 (1946).
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difficulty. The intendment of the founding fathers was to ensure
the economic unity of Australia. See. 92 was devised to do "no
!more than reinforce the conversion of six separate economic units
-intoone and ensure the operation therein of the contemporary concept of free trade."184 The clause is set in the context of a group
of provisions relating to finance and trade. However, the language of the section was unhappily broad. There were lawyers
both inside and outside the constitutional conventions who warned
of the dangers of such draftsmanship. The politicians, however,
triumphed; it was felt that "a little bit of layman's language"
might appeal to the electorate to whom the constitutional draft
was to be submitted for ratification.8 5
See. 92 is sui generis; it owed nothing to American precedent.8 American influence on Australian constitutional drafting
in the field of trade and commerce was significant in the power
field: Art. 1, See. 8 clause 3 investing Congress with power to regulate foreign and interstate commerce was paralleled by See. 51 (i)
which authorises Commonwealth legislation with respect to foreign and interstate trade and commerce. There are also comparable provisions which operate to limit power in this field. Art. 1,
Sec. 9, clause 3 prohibits the giving of preference by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one State over those
of another, while the Australian See. 99 provides that the Commonwealth shall not by any law or regulation of trade or commerce
give preference to one State or any part thereof over another State
or any part thereof. It is interesting to note that while the American commerce power has become a principal instrument of the extension of federal power, the substantially similar Australian commerce power has played a relatively minor role. There are various reasons which may help to explain this interesting difference. 87
We cannot pause to do more than footnote them here, but it is appropriate to observe that the judicial interpretation of See. 92 is
in some measure responsible.8 8
The great difficulties which have been experienced in the interpretation of See. 92 have arisen in large measure from the
words "absolutely free". While it has never been assumed that
these sweeping words deny any power of legislative regulation
84. Beasley, The Commonwealth Constitution: Section 92, 1
(Univ. of Western Australia) 433 (1948-50).
85. Bailey, supra note 77 at 328-329.
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whatsoever, 89 the High Court of Australia at a relatively early
stage cast off the anchor which a historical interpretation limiting the scope to the provision of intra-Australian fiscal freedom
would have provided. Once this step was taken it was difficult to
set limits. At one stage, the High Court accorded the words
"absolutely free" very wide scope. This position led to the
Court's conclusion that the section did not operate upon Commonwealth legislation, since this would have rendered nugatory the
Commonwealth legislative power with respect to interstate trade
and commerce. On this footing, it was held that Sec. 92 operated
only as a limit on State power and action. ° This view was rejected by the Privy Council some fifteen years later9 1 and it is now
settled law that the Section binds both Commonwealth and States.
It is not surprising then that. such an illdrawn section, deprived of its historical anchor, should have caused great trouble
and some very pretty quarrels in the courts. It has arisen for consideration in various contexts: among them Commonwealth-and
State marketing schemes principally with respect to primary
products; attempted State regulation of interstate road transport,
and in recent years Commonwealth legislative attempts to nationalize banking and interstate airlines. Notably in the Airlines,92
and Bank NationalizationCases, 9 3 there is to be found a good deal
of language which suggests that a purpose of the section is to ensure to individuals freedom of interstate competition. In the
words of one of the judges of the Australian High Court, "the
freedom guaranteed by Sec. 92 is a. personal right attaching to the
individual." 9 4 This does not represent the view of all the judges in
the recent cases, and in the opinion of the Privy Council in Bank of
New South Wales v. Commonwealth (the Bank Nationalization
Case), 5 there is a teasing passage in which it is suggested that
there may be circumstances in which prohibition with a view to
State monopoly may be "the only practical and reasonable manner
of regulation and that interstate trade, commerce and intercourse
89. "'Whatever 'free' in 'absolutely free' means, it cannot mean free from legislation, because both the States and the Commonwealth have power to legislate on trade and
commerce. 'Free,' it is submitted, is a political conception; it is the conception of an
orderly and ordered freedom, and not the conception of a chaotic license which would
result from allowing every individual to do exactly as he wished. No impediment or
hindrance is to be put upon trade among the States, it is not that its regulation is thereupon to cease." Per Lord Wright in James v. Commonwealth, [1936] A. C. 578, 593.
.90. .WZ-A. McMrthur,-Ltd-v.
Iueenslandr-28-C.L: P, -530- (1920);
91. James v. Commonwealth, [19361 A. C. 578.
"
.92. 71 C. L.M 29 (1945).
93. 76 C. L.-R.I -(1948) (High Court of -Australia); [1950] A. C. 235 -(-Priiy
Council).
94. Per Williams J. Australian National Airways Pty., Ltd. v. Comowealth,
71 CL.. R. 29o 111- (1945)..
95. [1950] A.C. 235, 311.
l
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thus prohibited and thus monopolised remained absolutely free."
However, both in the Airlines and Bank NationalizationCases the
decision was that national monopoly as opposed to private right of
trade violated the provisions of See. 92.
One Australian commentator, in an extended review of the
authorities has concluded that
under the Australian Constitution, the 'freedom' of trade, commerce and intercourse guaranteed under Sec. 92 is coming to be
interpreted to include tacitly within itself a guarantee of individual freedom of contract and choice of vocation of persons
operating within the field of interstate commerceY0
He suggests that Sec. 92 in this respect comes to serve the purposes which the due process and contracts clauses served in restraining the extension of federal power under the commerce
clause in the United States Constitution. This leads further to the
suggestion that at a period at which the Supreme Court of the
United States is interpreting the interstate commerce power in
very wide terms and is restricting the scope of constitutional
limitations on that power, the judicial interpretation of the Australian 7Constitution in this respect is following an opposite
course.
The suggestion that there are elements in the interpretation of
Sec. 92 which provide analogies to the employment of due process
in the American Constitution is interesting and provocative. Of
course, the parallels are imperfect; there is too much uncertainty
and there are too many strands in the interpretation of Sec. 92 to
make it possible to define its scope and operation with any dogmatic assurance."" But the American lawyer may find interest
(which to his Australian counterpart can only be painful interest)
in the evolution and interpretation of this Section which is demonstrably the most important limitation upon governmental power
in the Australian Constitution.

96. Stone, suPra note 86 at 511.

97. Stone notes that: "This difference in timing, however, may conceal a deeper
similarity. .
In th life cycle of her economy, Australia is only just beginning to feel
the full expansive pressure resulting from industralization under a private enterprise
economy.". Id. at 512.98. See Phillips, Trade Commerce and Intercourse, ESSAYS ON THB AUSTRALIAN
CoNsTITioN 256.259 (Else-Mitchell, ed. 1952).
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